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A general automaton model for timing-based systems is presented
and is used as the context for developing a variety of simulation proof
techniques for such systems. These techniques include (1) refine-
ments, (2) forward and backward simulations, (3) hybrid forward
backward and backwardforward simulations, and (4) history and
prophecy relations. Relationships between the different types of
simulations, as well as soundness and completeness results, are stated
and proved. These results are (with one exception) analogous to the
results for untimed systems in Part I of this paper. In fact, many of
the results for the timed case are obtained as consequences of the
analogous results for the untimed case. ] 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
Most of the existing semantic models, languages and
logics for describing and reasoning about timing-based
systems implicitly view an execution as an alternating
sequence of instantaneous ‘‘discrete’’ actions and ‘‘con-
tinuous’’ phases during which time advances [2, 5, 79, 11,
14, 17, 20, 2527, 48, 50, 52, 54, 61, 62]. To each system
described in any of these formalisms one can associate a
transition system or automaton consisting of (1) a set of
states, (2) a set of initial states, (3) a set of discrete actions,
(4) a set of discrete steps s$ wa s asserting that ‘‘from state s$
the system can instantaneously move to state s via the
occurrence of the discrete action a,’’ and, finally, (5) a set of
time-passage steps s$ wd s asserting that ‘‘from state s$ the
system can move to state s during a positive amount of time
d in which no discrete action occurs.’’
These transition systems provide a very abstract view of
the behavior of the original system in which many aspects,
such as the number of parallel components, the communica-
tion between these components, and the way in which a
system evolves during the continuous phases, are no longer
represented. Also, they are in general highly infinite and
may even have uncountable state spaces. Nevertheless, it is
clear that these transition systems play a central role in the
theory of timing-based systems:
v Many important behavioral preorders and equivalen-
ces, for instance those based on traces, failure pairs and
bisimulations, can be defined in terms of states and transi-
tions. Thus transition systems contain enough information
to define what it means that one system implements or is
equivalent to another system. Also, the transition systems
still contain enough information to serve as models for
many temporal and modal logics, i.e., they can be used to
define what it means that a system satisfies a formula.
v Many simulation proof techniques for verification of
implementation and equivalence relations between timing-
based systems can be defined and studied at the level of
transition systems.
v Transition systems provide an excellent framework for
comparing and interrelating a wide variety of different for-
malisms for timing-based systems. Moreover, since they
also play a central role in the ‘‘comparative semantics’’ of
untimed discrete event systems [18], they provide a basis
for comparing timed and untimed formalisms.
In this paper, we define a formal transition system model
for timing-based systems and use it to develop a variety of
simulation proof techniques. The key characteristic of the
transition systems discussed above is the presence of time-
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passage steps and the specific interpretation of these steps.
The transition systems always satisfy the following two
properties. First, if time can advance by a particular amount
d in two steps (with no intervening discrete steps), then it
can also advance by d in a single step. And second, if time
can advance by d in one step from state s$ to state s, then
there exists an assignment (a trajectory) that maps all times
in the interval [0, d ] to automaton states in a ‘‘consistent’’
way to explain how the system evolves from s$ to s. This
motivates our formal definition of a timed automaton as an
automaton (in the sense of Part I) whose set of actions
includes the set R+ of positive reals, and which satisfies the
above two properties for time-passage. We believe that
timed automata, defined in this way, provide an excellent
basis for defining and studying behavioral preorders and
simulation proof techniques for timing based systems. Since
timed automata can be viewed as an underlying semantic
domain for any of the models, languages and logics of [2, 5,
79, 11, 14, 17, 20, 2527, 48, 50, 52, 54, 61, 62], all the
results that we obtain for timed automata carry over
directly to those settings.
For convenience, we use R+ as our domain of times in
this paper. The need for dense-time models has been well
discussed in [4]. However, for the purpose of generality we
could have parameterized our timed automata by an
arbitrary (possibly discrete) time domain in the sense of [27,
53, 28]. We do not assume a general lower bound on the
time between events, or an upper bound on the number of
instantaneous actions; this choice is also made in, e.g., [7, 2,
9, 25, 48, 53, 61], but still distinguishes our model from
many others, e.g., [11, 17, 20, 50, 52, 55, 62]. The cost of
this generality is that our timed automata may produce
some annoying ‘‘Zeno executions,’’ i.e., infinite executions in
which the sum of the time-passage actions is bounded.
In order to define correctness for timed automata, we
define two notions of external behavior. First, as the finite
behaviors of a timed automaton, we take the finite timed
traces, each of which consists of a finite sequence of timed
visible actions together with a final time of observation.
Second, as the infinite behaviors, we take the admissible
timed traces, each of which consists of a sequence of timed
visible actions that occurs in some execution in which the
time grows unboundedly (i.e., a ‘‘non-Zeno’’ infinite execu-
tion). In [16] it is argued that inclusion of finite and
admissible timed traces is a good notion of implementation,
provided that the implementation automaton has a suf-
ficiently rich collection of admissible executions.
Inclusion of finite and admissible timed traces is implied
by inclusion of finite and infinite traces (if we consider the
R+ actions as externalvisible). Consequently all the
simulation proof techniques that we developed in Part I are
still ‘‘sound’’ for proving inclusion of timed traces, in the
sense that if one has established a simulation between timed
automata A and B it follows that the timed traces of A are
included in those of B. However, ‘‘completeness’’ is lost in
the sense that it may occur that the timed traces of a timed
automaton A are included in those of a timed automaton B,
but that there exists no simulation from A to B, not even if
it is allowed to use auxiliary intermediate timed automata.
One reason for this is that several of the constructions that
were used in the proofs of completeness results in Part I,
such as the canonical automaton and the unfolding, do not
yield timed automata in general. Alsoand this is much
more seriousinclusion of timed traces differs from inclu-
sion of traces in the case of systems with internal actions.
Example 1.1. Let A be the timed automaton that per-
forms no discrete actions but just lets time advance: the set
of states of A is R0, with 0 the initial state, and there is a
step t wd t+d, for each t # R0 and d # R+. Let B be the
timed automaton that behaves exactly as A, except that it
performs an internal {-step at time 1: the set of states of B
is R0_[T, F], with (0, T) the initial state, and there are
steps
v (t, T) wd (t+d, T), for each t # R0 and d # R+ with
t+d1;
v (1, T) w{ (1, F);
v (t, F) wd (t+d, F), for each t # R0 and d # R+.
Then A and B have different sets of traces since A has a trace
consisting of the single (time-passage) action 2, which B
does not have.
In our opinion, this example shows that traces are not
the right notion of behavior for timed automata: through the
absence of certain traces with large time-passage steps the
presence of certain internal actions in the system is revealed,
and thus internal actions are not truly invisible. Internal
actions have received proper attention in the context of
process algebras based on bisimulation or failures, and
thus the two systems of Example 1.1 are identified in the
approaches of (for instance) [30, 55, 14]. In models based
on linear time semantics, however, internal (or stuttering)
actions have largely been ignored. Abadi and Lamport [2]
advocate the use of untimed trace inclusion (logical impli-
cation in TLA) as an implementation relation for timed
systems. Although this ‘‘old-fashioned recipe’’ works in
many practical cases, the two systems of Example 1.1, which
can easily be translated to the state-based setting of [2],
indicate that it cannot be used in general, and that a serious
effort is required to fully adapt existing formalisms for
untimed systems to the timed setting.
Simulation methods have long been used successfully for
the verification of untimed concurrent systems. In Part I of
this paper [44], we gave a unified, comprehensive presen-
tation of simulation techniques for untimed systems,
including refinements, forward simulations, backward
simulations, forwardbackward and backwardforward
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simulations, history and prophecy relations. We showed
relationships among the different types of simulations and
soundness and completeness theorems. Part I also contains
pointers to examples of uses of simulation methods for
verification.
Because simulations have been so successful for untimed
systems, we believe that they will also prove to be success-
ful for timed systems. (Considerable evidence for this is
described below.) Thus, in writing Part II of this paper, our
goal has been to define timed versions of all the simulations
in Part I (timed refinements, timed forward simulations,
etc.) in terms of timed automata, and to establish the timed
versions of all the soundness, completeness and other results
of Part I.
The definitions of all of our timed simulations are
analogous to the definitions of the corresponding untimed
simulations in Part I, but are based on our new notions of
external behavior. It turns out that the results for timed
simulations are almost entirely analogous to those for the
untimed simulations (even though it requires considerable
effort to prove this). In fact, in many cases, we are able to
derive the results for timed simulations as consequences of
the results for untimed simulations. In the remaining cases,
new proofs analogous to those in Part I are presented. Our
presentation highlights the adaptability of the various
simulation techniques from the untimed to the timed set-
ting. There is just one minor result from Part I, Proposi-
tion 3.12, that does not carry over to the timed setting. We
remark that we found the definitions involving timed
automata and their simulations quite difficult to get ‘‘right.’’
These definitions involve many choices, most of which
either lead to longer proofs or do not yield all the properties
in this paper. The problem to develop a theory of timed
transition systems and timed simulations with analogues of
all results of Part I is still open.
This paper does not contain examples of verifications
carried out using timed simulations. However, our timed
simulations have already been used extensively elsewhere
[12, 23, 32, 3438, 45, 58, 60]. The algorithms and systems
verified in these papers include toy examples such as coun-
ters and process races, as well as substantial real examples
such as a clock-based at-most-once message delivery
protocol, a clock synchronization algorithm, two mutual
exclusion algorithms, a leader election algorithm, and a
communication protocol used in a consumer electronics
system. They also include a toy process control example
involving control of a railroad crossing gate. An interesting
feature of these proofs is that the simulations have been used
not only to prove ‘‘ordinary’’ safety properties, as in the
untimed setting, but also to prove timing properties, e.g.,
upper and lower bounds on time. In this way, the power of
simulation techniques seems to be much greater in the timed
setting than in the untimed setting. Also, the systems
verified are typically parameterized by arbitrary parameters
representing process speeds, message delivery times, clock
rates, etc., so that the results are very general. In [35, 19],
three of the proofs are automated using the Larch Prover
[22].
We consider the main contributions of this paper to be
the following: (a) The definition of a timed automaton and
of its external behavior. (b) The extension of simulation
notions for untimed systems to the timed setting. (c) The
unified presentation of all the simulation techniques
together with their basic soundness and completeness
properties. (d) The presentation of many auxiliary defini-
tions and results, for instance about sampling of computa-
tions, timed forests, timed unfolding, and a timed version of
the historization construction of [29]. (e) The fact that our
presentation parallels, and is closely based on, a similar
development for untimed systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
contains the definitions for timed automata and their execu-
tions and traces. Section 3 contains some definitions and
results for restricted types of timed automata. Section 4 dis-
cusses the structures that can be obtained as the behaviors
of timed automata. Section 5 contains the definitions of all
the timed simulations. Sections 6 and 7 contain the major
results of the paperthe relationships among the timed
simulations and the soundness and completeness results.
Section 6 contains those results that are derived from
corresponding results for the untimed case, while Section 7
contains those results that require new proofs, in parti-
cular, the construction of auxiliary (intermediate) timed
automata. Section 7 also contains the single example of a
result from Part I that does not carry over to the timed set-
ting. Section 8 describes how invariants can be included in
the simulations. Finally, Section 9 contains some conclu-
sions. Appendix A contains a discussion of some alternative
axioms for timed automata, and Appendix B gives a
glossary of notational conventions that we use. Because of
the strong dependence of this paper on Part I [44], we have
not tried to write this paper in a self-contained manner.
Thus, we employ freely the notation and definitions of
Part I, and refer in many places to the results from Part I.
2. TIMED AUTOMATA AND THEIR BEHAVIORS
In this section, we present the timed automaton model.
We define ‘‘timed executions,’’ which describe how timed
automata operate, and ‘‘timed traces,’’ which describe their
externally-visible behavior. A timed execution includes
information about discrete changes to the automaton’s
state, plus information about the evolution of the state as
time passes continuously.
Since timed automata are a special case of the (untimed)
automata defined in Part I of this paper [44], the notions of
‘‘execution’’ and ‘‘trace’’ for untimed automata also make
sense for timed automata. We relate the notions of execution
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and timed execution for a timed automaton: an execution
can be regarded as ‘‘sampling’’ the state information of a
timed execution at a countable number of points in time.
Also, we relate the notion of trace and timed trace.
2.1. Timed Automata
A timed automaton (or timed transition system) A is an
automaton (as defined in Part I) whose set of actions
includes R+, the set of positive reals.1 Actions from R+ are
referred to as time-passage actions, while non-time-passage
actions are referred to as discrete actions. We let d, d $, ...
range over R+ and more generally, t, t$, ... over the set
R0 _ [] of nonnegative real numbers plus infinity. The
set of visible actions is defined by vis(A) ] ext(A)&R+. In
this part of the paper, A, B, ... will range over timed
automata. We assume that a timed automaton satisfies two
axioms.
S1. If s$ wd s" and s" wd $ s, then s$ wwd+d $ s.
For the second axiom, we need an auxiliary definition of a
trajectory, which describes the state changes that can occur
during time-passage. Namely, if I is any left-closed interval
of R0 beginning with 0, then an I-trajectory is a function
w: I  states(A) such that
w(t) wwt$&t w(t$) for all t, t$ # I with t<t$.
Thus, a trajectory assigns a state to each time in the interval
I, in a ‘‘consistent’’ manner. We define w . ltime, the ‘‘last
time’’ of w, to be the supremum of I. In particular, if I is an
infinite interval then w . ltime is . We define w . fstate to be
w(0), and if I is right-closed, we also define w . lstate to be
w(w . ltime). A trajectory with a domain that is the single-
point interval [0, 0] is also called a trivial trajectory. A tra-
jectory for a step s$ wd s is a [0, d ]-trajectory such that
w . fstate=s$ and w . lstate=s. Now we can state the second
axiom.
S2. Each time-passage step s$ wd s has a trajectory.
Axiom S1 allows repeated time-passage steps to be com-
bined into one step. Axiom S2 is a kind of converse to S1;
it says that any time-passage step can be ‘‘filled in’’ with
states for each intervening time, in a consistent way.
In the modelling of hybrid systems, trajectories are often
used to describe the evolution of physical parameters
such as position, velocity, acceleration, temperature, and
pressure. In such cases, each trajectory w is describable as a
continuous function of time. Several models for hybrid
systems [47, 6] include the assumption that trajectories are
continuous. However, besides the model of this paper there
are also models that do not include such an assumption
[51], and in fact we do not need continuity of trajectories
for our results.
Axiom S2 is a strengthening of a similar axiom proposed
by Wang [61] and used in [42, 53], which, rephrased in
our terminology, reads:
S2$. If s$ wd s and 0<d $<d, then there is an s" such that
s$ wd $ s" and s" wwd&d $ s.
The stronger condition seems natural to usfor example, it
provides a direct way of modelling changes in physical
parameters in a hybrid system. Besides, we need it for some
of our results, for instance, Lemma 3.4. In Appendix A, we
discuss the relationship between axioms S2 and S2$ in more
detail and show that S2$ does not in general imply S2.
It is possible to combine two ‘‘compatible’’ trajectories of
a timed automaton A into one: if w1 is an I1-trajectory,
where I1 is right-closed, if w2 is an I2-trajectory, if
w1 . lstate=w2 . fstate, and if we let l1=w1 . ltime, then we
can define w1 } w2 to be the least function w such that
w(t)=w1(t) for t # I1 , and w(t+l1)=w2(t) for t # I2 .
Lemma 2.1. If w=w1 } w2 then w is an I-trajectory,
where I=I1 _ [t+l1 | t # I2].
Proof. Choose t, t$ # I with t<t$. We show that
w(t) wwt$&t w(t$). If t$l1 , this follows from the fact that w1
is an I1-trajectory, while if tl1 , this follows from the fact
that w2 is an I2-trajectory.
The remaining case is where t<l1<t$. In this case, the
fact that w1 is an I1-trajectory implies that w1(t) ww
l1&t w1 .
lstate, which implies that w(t) wwl1&t w1 .lstate. Also, the fact
that w2 is an I2-trajectory implies that w2 . fstate ww
t$&l1
w2(t$&l1), which implies that w2 . fstate ww
t$&l1 w(t$). Since
w1 .lstate=w2 .fstate, axiom S1 implies that w(t) ww
t$&t w(t$),
as needed. K
Likewise, we may combine a countable sequence of
‘‘compatible’’ trajectories into one: if wi is an Ii-trajectory,
for each positive integer i, where all Ii are right-closed, if
wi . lstate=wi+1 . fstate and if we let li=wi . ltime, for all i,
then the infinite concatenation w1 } w2 } w3 } } } is defined to
be the least function w such that w(t+j<i lj)=wi (t) for all
t # Ii .
Lemma 2.2. If w=w1 } w2 } w3 } } } then w is an I-trajec-
tory, where I= i [t+j<i lj | t # Ii].
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1 The decision to use only positive reals as time-passage actions is a
matter of taste. We could have allowed for a 0-action with an additional
axiom
S0. s$ w0 s if and only if s$=s.
However, we would like to distinguish the discrete action { from the time-
passage action 0, for both conceptual and technical reasons: the definitions
of several process algebraic operations on timed automata, as discussed in
[42], become much more involved if {’s are treated as time-passage
actions.
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2.2. Timed Executions
Since a timed automaton is a special case of an
automaton (as defined in Part I), we already have a notion
of execution for timed automata; an execution is an alternat-
ing sequence of states and actions (including time-passage
actions as a special case), subject to the natural consistency
constraints. However, this type of execution only describes
the system state at a countable number of points in time.
Since our trajectory axiom gives us the ability to associate
states with all the real times occurring during a time-passage
step, we define a notion of timed execution, which includes
such information. The usual kind of execution can be
regarded as ‘‘sampling’’ a timed execution at countably
many points in time, as we show in Section 2.4.2 below.
2.2.1. Basic Definitions
A timed execution fragment of a timed automaton A is a
finite or infinite alternating sequence W=w0 a1w1a2w2 } } } ,
where:
1. Each wi is a trajectory and each ai is a discrete action.
2. If W is a finite sequence then it ends with a trajectory.
3. If wi is not the last trajectory in W then its domain is
a right-closed interval and wi . lstate ww
ai+1 wi+1. fstate.
An execution fragment describes all the discrete changes
that occur, plus the evolution of the state during time-
passage steps. The last property says that each pair
(wi , wi+1) of successive trajectories in the fragment
‘‘matches up’’ properly, in that the intervening discrete
action ai+1 spans properly between the last state of wi and
the first state of wi+1.
Note that the definition of a timed execution fragment
allows the modelling of consecutive discrete actions,
without intervening time-passage. In this case, the trajectory
between the two discrete actions is trivial.
If W is a timed execution fragment then we let W . ltime
denote i wi . ltime. Note that we allow the case where the
domain of the final trajectory is of the form [0, ); in this
case, W . ltime=. We define the first state of W, W . fstate,
to be w0 . fstate. A timed execution is a timed execution
fragment W for which W . fstate is a start state.
Note that the super-dense computations of [47]
correspond closely to our timed executions.
2.2.2. Finite, Admissible, and Zeno Timed Executions
In this paper, we will be interested in certain subclasses of
the set of timed executions: the finite, admissible, and Zeno
timed executions. The distinctions involve whether or not
time passes to infinity, and whether an infinite or finite
amount of activity occurs. Thus, we define a timed execu-
tion fragment W to be
1. finite if W is a finite sequence and the domain of its
final trajectory is a right-closed interval,
2. admissible if W . ltime=, and
3. Zeno if W is neither finite nor admissible.
If W is a finite timed execution fragment with final trajec-
tory wi , then W . ltime is finite. In this case, we define
W . lstate, the last state of :, to be wi . lstate. We define a state
s to be t-reachable in timed automaton A provided that
there is a finite timed execution W such that W . lstate=s.
The following fact follows directly by axiom S2.
Lemma 2.3. A state s of a timed automaton A is t-reach-
able if and only if it is reachable, i.e., there is an ordinary
finite execution of A that ends in s.
An important implication of Lemma 2.3 is that any
technique that can prove that a property holds for all final
states of (ordinary) finite executions is a sound technique
for proving that a property holds in all t-reachable states of
a timed automaton. In particular, induction on the steps of
ordinary executions is sound in this sense.
If W is a finite timed execution fragment with final trajec-
tory wi , W$ is a timed execution fragment with initial trajec-
tory w$0 , and wi . lstate=w$0 . fstate, then we define W } W$ to
be the timed execution fragment obtained by concatenating
the sequences W and W$, except that the consecutive pair of
trajectories wi and w$0 is replaced by wi } w$0 . Lemma 2.1
implies that W } W$ is in fact a timed execution fragment. If
W and W$ are timed execution fragments, then define W$ to
be a t-prefix of W, denoted by W$PW, if either W$=W, or
else W$ is finite and there exists a timed execution fragment
W" such that W$ } W"=W. Relation P is a partial ordering
on timed execution fragments.
The admissible timed execution fragments are those in
which time passes without bound. Since (we believe) time
does pass without bound in the real world, it is reasonable
to restrict attention to the admissible timed executions when
arguing the correctness of a system represented as a timed
automaton. In this paper, we focus on the admissible and
finite timed executions, and mostly ignore Zeno timed
executions. We denote by t-frag*(A), t-frag(A), and
t-frag(A) the sets of finite, admissible, and all timed execu-
tion fragments of A. Similarly, we denote by t-execs*(A),
t-execs(A), and t-execs(A) the sets of finite, admissible,
and all timed executions of A.
The notion of admissibility is the only notion of liveness
that we include in our model. Many untimed automaton
models (e.g., [40, 46, 31]) include facilities for describing
rich classes of liveness properties, for example, various
notions of fairness. In the timed setting, it is often possible
to replace liveness notions with corresponding timing
restrictions. These can be expressed by restrictions on time-
passage steps, so they do not require any special machinery.
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The notion of admissibility is in some sense more tractable
mathematically than some other liveness notions, e.g., the
notion of a ‘‘fair execution’’ in the IO automaton model
[40]. This is because the admissible timed executions of a
timed automaton can be expressed as the limits of infinite
sequences of finite timed executions.
Proposition 2.4. The admissible timed executions are
exactly the limits of the infinite sequences of finite timed
executions, where each timed execution in the sequence of a
t-prefix of the next and the . ltime values approach .
The characterization in Proposition 2.4 permits the
reduction of questions about infinite behaviors to questions
about their finite prefixes. A similar reduction is not possible
in untimed models that incorporate fairness.
One could extend the timed automaton model presented
here by adding other liveness properties. Such an extended
model is defined, and its properties explored, in [32, 58,
16]. In [32, 58], the extended model is also applied to sub-
stantial communication examples.
Zeno timed executions are a technical anomaly; they
represent an infinite amount of activity occurring in a finite
amount of time, which is (we believe) impossible in reality.
Nevertheless, our definition of timed automata does admit
Zeno executions. There are two types of Zeno timed execu-
tions in our model:
1. those containing infinitely many discrete actions, but
for which . ltime is finite, and
2. those containing finitely many discrete actions, but
for which the domain of the final trajectory is a right-open
interval with a finite supremum.
For this second type of Zeno timed execution, the ‘‘infinite
amount of activity occurring in a finite amount of time’’
corresponds to an infinite number of time-passage steps
needed to span the final interval.
According to our definitions, there are timed automata in
which from some (or even all) states no admissible timed
execution fragment is possible. This can be, for instance,
because from these states time can continue advancing, but
not beyond a certain point (that is, all timed execution
fragments starting from these states are Zeno), or because
time cannot advance at all (that is, a time deadlock occurs).
Our model does allow time deadlocks. However, in several
of our theorems we will require that the timed automata be
‘‘feasible’’: a timed automaton is feasible provided that each
finite timed execution is a t-prefix of some admissible timed
execution.2 A feasible timed automaton does not have time
deadlocks, but it will have Zeno timed executions, simply
because each feasible timed execution has t-prefixes that are
Zeno timed excutions.
2.3. Timed Traces
Since a timed automaton is an automaton (as defined in
Part I), we already have a notion of trace for timed
automata. However, the traces of timed automata do not
provide a sufficiently abstract notion of external behavior
for timed automata, because they do not reflect the invisible
nature of time-passage actions (see Example 1.1 in the intro-
duction). In this subsection, we define a new notion of exter-
nal behavior for timed automata, which we call timed traces.
These do not include explicit time-passage events, but do
include information about the real time of visible events, as
well as the final time up to which the observation is made.
We first define the auxiliary technical notion of a timed
sequence pair, a general data type that is used in the defini-
tion of a timed trace.
2.3.1. Timed Sequence Pairs
Let K be any set with K & R+=<. Then a timed sequence
over K is defined to be a (finite or infinite) sequence $ over
K_R0 in which the time components are nondecreasing,
i.e., if (k, t) and (k$, t$) are consecutive elements in $ then
tt$. We say that $ is Zeno if it is infinite and the limit of
the time components is finite.
A timed sequence pair over K is a pair p=($, t), where $
is a timed sequence over K and t # R0 _ [], such that t
is greater than or equal to the limit of the time components
in $, and equal to this limit if $ is an infinite sequence. We
write p .seq and p . ltime for the two respective components
of p, and denote by tsp(K) the set of timed sequence pairs
over K. We say that a timed sequence pair p is finite if both
p .seq and p . ltime are finite, and admissible if p .seq is not
Zeno and p . ltime=.
Let p and p$ be timed sequence pairs over K with p finite.
Then define p } p$ to be the timed sequence pair ( p .seq $,
p . ltime+p$ . ltime), where $ is the modification of p$ .seq
obtained by adding p . ltime to all the time components. If p
and q are timed sequence pairs over K, then p is a prefix of
q, denoted by pq, if either p=q, or p is finite and there
exists a timed sequence pair p$ such that p } p$=q. Relation
 is a partial ordering on the set of timed sequence pairs
over K.
We describe how to translate from a sequence over
K _ R+ to a timed sequence pair over K and vice versa.
First, if ; is any sequence over K _ R+, then we define the
time of occurrence of any K-element in ; to be the sum of all
the reals that precede that element in ;. We also define
; . ltime to be the sum of all the reals in ;. In case ; is the
empty sequence, we define ; . ltime=0. Finally, we define
t-trace( ;) to be the timed sequence pair ($, ; . ltime), where
$ is the subsequence of ; consisting of all the elements of K,
each paired with its time of occurrence.
Conversely, if p is a timed sequence pair over K, then we
define trace( p), a corresponding sequence over K _ R+.
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Namely, if p . ltime is finite or p .seq is infinite, then let
trace( p) be the unique sequence ; over K _ R+ such that
p=t-trace( ;) and such that ; does not contain two con-
secutive elements of R+. On the other hand, if p . ltime is
infinite and p .seq finite, then let trace( p) be the unique
sequence ; over K _ R+ such that p=t-trace( ;), such that
; does not contain two consecutive elements of R+ prior to
the last K element, and such that the portion of ; after the
last K element is the default sequence 111 } } } .
Thus by construction:
Lemma 2.5. For any timed sequence pair p over K,
t-trace(trace( p))=p.
Let ; be a sequence over K _ R+. Then we say that ; is
admissible if the sum of the positive reals in ; is infinite.
Lemma 2.6. ; is admissible if and only if t-trace( ;) is
admissible.
It is not the case that ; is finite if and only if t-trace( ;) is
finite. A counterexample is provided by the infinite sequence
1
2
1
4
1
8 } } } , of which the associated timed sequence pair (*, 1) is
finite. (Recall that * is the empty sequence.)
2.3.2. Timed Traces of Timed Automata
Suppose that W=w0a1 w1a2 w2 } } } is a timed execution
fragment of a timed automaton A. For each ai , define the
time of occurrence ti to be j<i wj . ltime, i.e., the sum of the
lengths of all the trajectory intervals preceding ai in W. Let
$=(a1 , t1)(a2 , t2) } } } be the sequence consisting of the
actions in W paired with their times of occurrence. Then
t-trace(W ), the timed trace of W, is defined to be the pair3
t-trace(W ) ] ($ W (vis(A)_R0), W . ltime).
Thus, t-trace(W ) records the occurrences of visible actions
together with their times of occurrence, as well as the last
time. Note that neither internal actions nor time-passage
actions appear explicitly in the timed trace of W.
Lemma 2.7. If W is a timed execution fragment of A then
t-trace(W ) is a timed sequence pair over vis(A).
Lemma 2.8. If W=W1 } W2 is a timed execution frag-
ment of A then t-trace(W )=t-trace(W1) } t-trace(W2).
A timed trace of A is the timed trace of any finite or
admissible timed execution of A. Thus, we explicitly exclude
the traces of Zeno executions. We write t-traces(A) for the
set of all timed traces of A, t-traces*(A) for the set of finite
timed traces, i.e., those that are derived from finite timed
executions of A, and t-traces(A) for the admissible timed
traces, i.e., those that are derived from admissible timed
executions of A. The following lemma is a direct conse-
quence of the definitions.
Lemma 2.9. The sets t-traces*(A) and t-traces(A) con-
sist of finite timed sequence pairs and admissible timed
sequence pairs over vis(A), respectively.
These notions induce three natural preorders on timed
automata. Namely, we define AtT B to mean that t-traces(A)
t-traces(B), At
*T
B to mean that t-traces*(A)
t-traces*(B), and AtT B to mean that t-traces
(A)
t-traces(B). The kernels of these preorders are denoted by
#tT , #t*T and #
t
T , respectively.
2.3.3. Moves
We include in this section one last definition, which is
used in all the simulation definitions in Section 5.
Suppose A is a timed automaton, s$ and s are states of A,
and p is a timed sequence pair over vis(A). Then we say that
(s$, p, s) is a t-move of A, and write s$ p A s, or just s$ 
p s
when A is clear, if A has a finite timed execution fragment
W with W . fstate=s$, t-trace(W )=p, and W . lstate=s.
Lemma 2.10. Suppose p, p1 and p2 are timed sequence
pairs over vis(A) and p=p1 } p2 .
1. If s$ 
p1
A s" and s" 
p2
A s then s$ 
p
A s.
2. If s$ p A s then there exists s" such that s$ 
p1
A s" and
s" 
p2
A s.
2.4. Relating Timed and Untimed Execution Fragments
In this subsection, we present some close connections
between the timed execution fragments and the (ordinary)
execution fragments of a timed automaton. Roughly speak-
ing, an execution fragment can be regarded as ‘‘sampling’’
the state information in a timed execution fragment at
a countable number of points in time. This close corre-
spondence allows techniques for reasoning about ordinary
execution fragments to be used for timed execution
fragments (and vice versa).
2.4.1. Execution Fragments of Timed Automata
Suppose that : is an (ordinary) execution fragment of
timed automaton A. We may define various timing notions
for : simply, as follows.
t-trace(:) ] t-trace(trace(:))
: . ltime ] trace(:) . ltime
As in Part I, : is defined to be finite if it is a finite sequence.
We define : to be admissible if : . ltime=, and Zeno if it is
neither finite nor admissible.
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2.4.2. Sampling
To see the connections between the timing notions
defined for (ordinary) executions and the corresponding
ones for timed executions, we define a notion of ‘‘sampling.’’
Let :=s0a1 s1 } } } be an execution fragment of A and let
W=w0 b1 w1 } } } be a timed execution fragment of A. We
define two auxiliary functions: f gives for each index i of :
the number of discrete actions that precede si , and g gives
for each index i of : the amount of time between si and the
last discrete action preceding si . Formally, for all i,
f (0)=0,
f (i+1)={ f (i)+1f (i)
if ai+1 discrete,
otherwise.
g(0)=0,
g(i+1)={0g(i)+ai+1
if ai+1 discrete,
otherwise.
We say that : samples W provided that the following condi-
tions are satisfied.
1. f is a surjective mapping from indices of : to indices
of W.
2. For all i, si=wf (i)( g(i)).
3. For all i>0 with ai discrete, ai=bf (i) and g(i&1)=
wf (i&1) . ltime.
4. : . ltime=W . ltime.
5. : is finite if and only if W is finite.
The function f maps each state si in : to the trajectory of W
to which it belongs. The first condition states that for each
trajectory of W there should be at least one state of : that
belongs to it. The second condition specifies how function g
determines the position of si within the associated trajec-
tory. The third condition guarantees that the discrete
actions match up, and that the amount of idling in between
discrete actions is the same for : and W. The last two condi-
tions ensure that things match up properly at the end of the
executions. The definition immediately implies that if :
samples W then : is admissible if and only if W is
admissible, and : is Zeno if and only if W is Zeno.
The following two lemmas show the close relationship
between timed execution fragments and ordinary execution
fragments. Note that these connections hold for finite,
admissible and Zeno (timed) executions. The proofs are
routine; the proof of Lemma 2.11 uses Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2.
Lemma 2.11. If : is an execution of A then there is a
timed execution fragment W of A such that : samples W.
Lemma 2.12. If W is a timed execution fragment of A
then there is an execution fragment : of A such that :
samples W.
Finally, we relate the definition of timed traces for execu-
tion fragments to the corresponding definition for timed
execution fragments.
Lemma 2.13. If : samples W then t-trace(:)=t-trace(W ).
3. RESTRICTED KINDS OF TIMED AUTOMATA
In this section, paralleling our development in Part I, we
define certain restricted kinds of timed automata that are
useful in our proofs. Recall that in Part I, we defined what
it meant for an untimed automaton to be deterministic, to
have finite invisible nondeterminism ( fin), and to be a forest.
Now we define analogous notions of t-deterministic, t-fin,
and t-forest.
First, we say that timed automaton A is t-deterministic if
|start(A)|=1 and for any state s$ and any finite timed
sequence pair p over vis(A), there is at most one state s such
that s$ p A s. It turns out that this notion is equivalent to the
original notion of determinism:
Lemma 3.1. Timed automaton A is t-deterministic if and
only if it is deterministic.
Proof. Recall that the definition of determinism says
that |start(A)|=1 and that for any state s$ and finite
sequence ; of actions in ext(A), there is at most one state s
such that s$=O
;
s.
O: We suppose that A is t-deterministic and show that it
is deterministic. The start condition is immediate. Suppose
for the sake of contradiction that A is not deterministic;
then there exist s$, ;, s1 , and s2 such that s$=O
;
s1 , s$=O
;
s2
and s1{s2 . This means that there are two execution
fragments, :1 and :2 , each starting with s$ and having trace
;, one of which ends in s1 and the other in s2 . Then
Lemma 2.11 implies that there are two timed execution
fragments, W1 and W2 , that are sampled by :1 and :2
respectively. By Lemma 2.13, W1 and W2 have the same
timed trace, say p. It follows that s$ p s1 and s$ 
p s2 , which
violates t-determinism, yielding the needed contradiction.
o: We suppose that A is deterministic and show that it
is t-deterministic. The start condition is immediate. Suppose
for the sake of contradiction that A is not t-deterministic;
then there exist s$, p, s1 , and s2 such that s$ 
p s1 , s$ 
p s2 ,
and s1{s2 . This means that there are two timed execution
fragments, W1 and W2 , each starting with s$ and having
timed trace p, one of which ends in s1 and the other in s2 .
Then Lemma 2.12 implies that there are two execution
fragments, :1 and :2 , that sample W1 and W2 respectively.
By Lemma 2.13, :1 and :2 have the same timed trace, say p.
By applying axiom S2 to split time-passage actions, we may
assume without loss of generality that :1 and :2 have the
same trace, say ;. It follows that s$=O
;
s1 and s$=O
;
s2 , which
violates determinism, yielding the needed contradiction. K
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A simple characterization of t-determinism is then
obtained from Lemma 3.1 and a characterization of deter-
minism in Part I:
Lemma 3.2. A timed automaton A is t-deterministic if
and only if |start(A)|=1, every { transition is of the form
(s, {, s) for some s, and for any state s$ and any action (either
visible, internal or time-passage) a there is at most one state
s such that s$ wa s.
Second, we say that A has t-finite invisible nondeterminism
(t-fin) if start(A) is finite, and for any state s$ and any finite
timed sequence pair p over vis(A), there are only finitely
many states s such that s$ p A s. It is not hard to see that the
analogous result to Lemma 3.1 for t-fin fails:
Example 3.3. Let A be the timed automaton with no
visible actions that can do { actions at any time and remem-
bers the times at which it has done these internal actions.
The states of A consist of components now # R0, initially 0,
and tau-timesR0, initially empty. The allowed steps are:
v s$ w{ s, where s .now=s$ .now and s . tau-times =
s$ . tau-times _ [s$ .now], plus
v s$ wd s, where s .now=s$ .now+d and s .tau-times=
s$ . tau-times.
Then A has fin but does not have t-fin.
Third and finally, we say that A is a t-forest if every state
s has a unique timed execution W that leads to it, i.e., such
that W . lstate=s. In the case of timed automata, the
original definition of a forest is trivial: no timed automaton
that contains a time-passage step can be a forest. This is
because if a state s is reached by an execution that ends with
a time-passage step, then axiom S2 allows that time-passage
step to be split in two, yielding a different execution leading
to s. We can obtain a characterization of t-forests,
analogous to the characterization in Part I for forests:
Lemma 3.4. A timed automaton A is a t-forest if and only
if all states of A are reachable, start states have no incoming
steps, and for every state s, if there are two distinct steps lead-
ing to s, r wa s and r$ wa$ s, then a and a$ are distinct time-
passage actions, and either r wwa&a$ r$ or r$ wwa$&a r (depending
on whether a>a$ or a$>a).
Proof. O: All states in a t-forest are reachable by
Lemma 2.3. It is also easy to see that start states have no
incoming steps. So suppose that r wa s and r$ wa$ s, with
(r, a){(r$, a$). Let W and W$ be the unique timed execu-
tions leading to r and r$, respectively.
We extend W to timed execution W1 by adding the infor-
mation contained in the step r wa s. Specifically, if a is a dis-
crete action, we append a and a trivial trajectory with the
single state s to W. On the other hand, if a # R+, we use
axiom S2 to obtain a trajectory w for the step r wa s and
combine w with the final trajectory of W; Lemma 2.1
implies that the combination of the two trajectories is itself
a trajectory. Likewise, we extend W$ to timed execution W$1
by adding the information contained in the step r$ wa$ s.
Since A is a t-forest and W1 and W$1 both lead to s, it must
be that W1=W$1 . But since (r, a){(r$, a$), the only way this
can happen is if a and a$ are both time-passage actions and
a{a$. In this case, the final trajectory w of W1=W$1 ends
with a trajectory of the step r wa s, and also ends with a
trajectory of the step r$ wa$ s. In particular, if w . ltime=t,
then w(t&a$)=r$ and w(t&a)=r.
If a<a$, then t&a$<t&a, so the definition of a trajec-
tory implies that r$ wwwww(t&a)&(t&a$) r, i.e., r$ wwa$&a r. Symmetri-
cally, if a$<a, we have r wwa&a$ r$. Either situation suffices.
o: Because all states of A are reachable, we know by
Lemma 2.3 that for each state s there is at least one timed
execution that leads to it. We show uniqueness. For any
timed execution W, define n(W ) to be the sum of the
number of nontrivial trajectories and the number of actions
occurring in W. It suffices to prove the following claim for
all k # N:
If W and W$ are two timed executions with
n(W )+n(W$)k, and if W and W$ lead to the
same state s, then W=W$.
We prove this claim by induction on k.
Basis. k=0. Then each of W and W$ consists of a trivial
trajectory with the single state s, so W=W$.
Inductive Step. k>0. If W consists of a single trivial
trajectory, then s must be a start state. The fact that W$
leads to s implies that the start state s has an incoming step,
which is a contradiction. A similar contradiction is reached
if W$ consists of a single trivial trajectory. Thus, neither W
nor W$ consists of a single trivial trajectory.
If the last trajectory w of W is trivial, define a to be the last
discrete action in W, and r the last state of the preceding tra-
jectory. Thus, we have r wa s. Since each state can have at
most one incoming discrete step, the last trajectory of W$
must also be trivial, a must be the last discrete action in W$,
and r the last state of the preceding trajectory of W$. If W1
and W$1 are the timed executions obtained from W and W$,
respectively, by omitting the a w fragment at the end, the
induction hypothesis gives W1=W$1 . This implies W=W$.
A similar proof can be given for case in which the last tra-
jectory of W$ is trivial. Thus we may assume that neither W
nor W$ ends with a trivial trajectory.
Define r=w(0) and a=w . ltime; the definition of a trajec-
tory implies r wa s. Likewise, define r$, a$, and w$ for W$.
If a=a$, then it is easy to prove that w=w$. In this case,
let W1 and W$1 be the results of removing the last trajectory
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w from W and W$, respectively, replacing it with the trivial
trajectory with state r. Application of the induction
hypothesis gives W1=W$1 , and this implies W=W$.
Assume without loss of generality that a$>a. Since r wa s
and r$ wa$ s, we have by assumption r$ wwa$&a r. That is, both
timed executions end with nontrivial trajectories, and W
ends with the shorter one.
We claim that w(a&t)=w$(a$&t) for all t # [0, a]. For if
not, then there are two distinct time-passage steps leading
to s with the same amount of time-passage, namely,
w(a&t) wt s and w$(a$&t) wt s. In particular, r=w(0)=
w$(a$&a).
Now let W1 be the result of removing the last trajectory
w from W, replacing it with the trivial trajectory with state
r. Also, let W$1 be the result of reducing the last trajectory w$
of W$ by removing the portion with domain (a$&a, a$].
Then W1 and W$1 are two timed executions, each of which
leads to r, and such that n(W1)+n(W$1) is strictly less than
n(W )+n(W$). By induction hypothesis, W1=W$1 . Since
the removed portions of W and W$ are identical, this implies
that W=W$. K
We define the relation t-after(A) to consist of those pairs
( p, s) for which there is a finite timed execution of A with
timed trace p and last state s:
t-after(A) ] [( p, s) | _W # t-execs*(A):
t-trace(W )=p and W . lstate=s].
The relation t-past(A) ] t-after(A)&1 relates a state s of A
to the timed traces of timed executions that lead to s.
Lemma 3.5.
1. If A is t-deterministic then t-after(A) is a function from
t-traces*(A) to states(A).
2. If A has t-fin then t-after(A) is image-finite.
3. If A is a t-forest then t-past(A) is a function from
states(A) to t-traces*(A).
Proof. Parts 1 and 2 are straightforward from the defini-
tions.
For 3, suppose that A is a t-forest. Because all states
of A are reachable we know that for each state s of A,
t-past(A)(s) contains at least one element. But this element
is uniquely determined by the unique timed execution that
leads to s. K
4. TIMED TRACE PROPERTIES
Continuing the analogy with Part I, we define ‘‘timed
trace properties,’’ the structures that we consider as external
behaviors for timed automata. We also prove some basic
properties of timed trace properties and some lemmas
relating timed trace properties to timed automata.
A set of timed sequence pairs is prefix-closed if, whenever
a timed sequence pair is in the set, all its prefixes (as defined
in Section 2.3.1) are in the set also. A timed trace property P
is a pair (K, L), where K is a set and L is a nonempty, prefix-
closed set of finite and admissible timed sequence pairs over
K. We will refer to the constituents of P as sort(P) and
t-traces(P), respectively. Also, we write t-traces*(P) for
the set of finite timed sequence pairs in t-traces(P), and
t-traces(P) for the set of admissible timed sequence pairs
in t-traces(P). For P and Q timed trace properties, we define
P t
*T
Q ] t-traces*(P)  t-traces*(Q), P tT Q ]
t-traces(P)t-traces(Q), and PtT Q ] t-traces(P)
t-traces(Q). The kernels of these preorders are denoted by
#t*T , #
t
T , and #
t
T , respectively.
A timed trace property P is limit-closed if each infinite
chain p1p2p3 } } } of elements of t-traces*(P) in which
time grows unboundedly has a limit in t-traces(P), i.e., an
admissible timed sequence pair p such that for all i, pip.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose P and Q are timed trace properties
with Q limit-closed. Then Pt
*T
Q  PtT Q.
A timed trace property P is feasible if every element of
t-traces*(P) is a prefix of some element of t-traces(P).
Lemma 4.2. Suppose P and Q are timed trace properties
such that P is feasible. Then PtT Q  P
t
T Q.
The timed behavior of a timed automaton A, t-beh(A), is
defined by
t-beh(A) ] (vis(A), t-traces(A)).
Lemma 4.3.
1. t-beh(A) is a timed trace property.
2. If A has t-fin then t-beh(A) is limit-closed.
3. If A is feasible then t-beh(A) is feasible.
4. AtT B  t-beh(A)
t
T t-beh(B), A
t
*T
B  t-beh(A)
t*T t-beh(B), and A
t
T B  t-beh(A)
t
T t-beh(B).
Proof. Part 1 follows directly from Lemma 2.9. Parts 3
and 4 are immediate from the definitions.
We sketch the proof of 2; it is analogous to that of
Lemma 2.5 of Part I. Suppose A has t-fin and p1p2 } } }
is an infinite chain of timed sequence pairs in t-traces*(A)
such that the limits of the time components of the pi’s is .
Assume without loss of generality that pi<pi+1 , for all
i1. Let p be the limit of the pi’s. We must show that
p # t-traces(A).
We use Lemma A.1 of Part I. This time, G is constructed
as follows. The nodes are pairs ( pi , s), where pi is one of the
timed sequence pairs in the sequence above, and s is a state
of A, such that ( p, s) # t-after(A). There is an edge from
node ( pi , s$) to node ( pi+1 , s) exactly if s$ 
q
A s, where
pi+1=pi } q. Using Lemma 2.10, it is not difficult to show
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that G satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma A.1 of Part I. Then
that lemma implies the existence of an infinite path in G
starting at a root; given this path, it is easy to construct an
admissible timed execution of A having p as its timed trace.
Proposition 4.4.
1. If B has t-fin then At
*T
B  AtT B.
2. If A is feasible then AtT B  A
t
T B.
Proof. Part 1 follows from Lemmas 4.1 and 4.3. Part 2 is
a corollary of Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. K
Example 4.5. We present two timed automata, B1 and
B2 , which are in a sense the timed analogues of the
automata A1 and A2 of Example 2.1 of Part I. The example
illustrates the necessity of the t-fin condition in Proposi-
tion 4.4(1). Timed automaton B1 performs an a-action at
each integer time. Each state of B1 has components
now # R0 and count # N, both initially 0. B1 has a single
visible action a, and steps
v s$ wd s, where s .now=s$ .now+ds$ .count and
s .count=s$ .count ;
v s$ wa s, where s .now=s$ .now=s$ .count and s .count=
s$ .count+1.
Timed automaton B2 performs an a-action at each of finitely
many integer times. Each state of B2 has components
now # R0, initially 0, count # N, initially 0, and total # N,
initially arbitrary. B1 has a single visible action a and steps
v s$ wd s, where s .now=s$ .now+ds$ .count, s .count=
s$ .count, and s . total=s$ . total ;
v s$ wa s, where s .now=s$ .now=s$ .counts$ . total,
s .count=s$ .count+1, and s . total=s$ . total.
Then it is easy to see that B1 has t-fin (in fact, it is
t-deterministic). However, B2 does not have t-fin: for
instance, it has infinitely many start states. Also, in each
finite timed trace of B2 , a occurs at every nonnegative
integer time up to (and possibly including) the last time
total, while in the unique admissible timed trace of B1 , a
occurs at all nonnegative integer times. Then B2 has the
same finite timed traces as B1 but no admissible timed
traces. It follows that B1t*T B2 but B13
t
*T B2 .
Note that it is possible to modify B2 so that it is feasible,
yet still demonstrates the same point. Simply allow time to
pass in B2 after the last permitted a output.
Example 4.6. In order to see that the feasibility condi-
tion in Proposition 4.4(2) is needed, we consider a timed
automaton Z with states drawn from the interval [0, 1),
start state 0, no visible actions, and steps of the form
t$ wwt&t$ t whenever t$<t. Since Z has no admissible timed
traces, it is trivially the case that ZtT B1 . However,
because B1 does not allow initial time-passage steps,
Z3 tT B1 .
Again paralleling Part I, we close this section with the
construction of the canonical timed automaton for a given
timed trace property. For P a timed trace property, the
associated canonical timed automaton t-can(P) is the
structure A given by
v states(A)=t-traces*(P),
v start(A)=[(*, 0)],
v acts(A)=sort(P) _ [{] _ R+, and
v for p$, p # states(A) and a # acts(A),
p$ wa A p  a{{ 7 p$ } t-trace(a)=p.
It is not hard to check that t-can(P) is in fact a timed
automaton.
Lemma 4.7. Suppose P is a timed trace property. Then
1. t-can(P) is t-deterministic and is a t-forest.
2. t-beh(t-can(P))#t*T P.
3. PtT t-beh(t-can(P)).
4. If P is limit-closed then t-beh(t-can(P))#tT P.
5. If P is feasible then t-can(P) is feasible.
Proof. Part 1 follows easily using Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4.
Part 2 follow from the definitions. Since t-can(P) is
t-deterministic it has t-fin, so it follows by Lemma 4.3 that
t-beh(t-can(P)) is limit-closed. Now 3 and 4 follow by
combination of 2 and Lemma 4.1. Part 5 is straightforward
from the definitions. K
Lemma 4.8.
1. t-can(t-beh(A)) is t-deterministic and is a t-forest.
2. t-can(t-beh(A))#t
*T
A.
3. A tT t-can(t-beh(A)).
4. If A has t-fin then t-can(t-beh(A))#tT A.
5. If A is feasible then t-can(t-beh(A)) is feasible.
Proof. By combining Lemmas 4.3 and 4.7. K
5. SIMULATIONS FOR TIMED AUTOMATA
So far, we have presented the timed automaton model
and its basic properties. In this section, we define simulation
proof methods for timed automata. The properties of these
relations are shown in the following two sections. In the
definitions below, we require that an a step be simulated by
a move t-trace(a^). This means that a { step is simulated by
the timed sequence pair (*, 0), a visible action a is simulated
by the timed sequence pair ((a, 0), 0), and a time-passage
step d is simulated by the timed sequence pair (*, d ).
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Suppose A and B are timed automata.
A timed refinement from A to B is a function
r: states(A)  states(B) that satisfies:
1. If s # start(A) then r(s) # start(B).
2. If s$ wa A s then r(s$) 
p
B r(s), where p=t-trace(a^).
A timed forward simulation from A to B is a relation f over
states(A) and states(B) that satisfies:
1. If s # start(A) then f [s] & start(B){<.
2. If s$ wa A s and u$ # f [s$], then there exists a state
u # f [s] such that u$ p B u, where p=t-trace(a^).
A timed backward simulation from A to B is a total4 rela-
tion b over states(A) and states(B) that satisfies:
1. If s # start(A) then b[s]start(B).
2. If s$ wa A s and u # b[s], then there exists a state
u$ # b[s$] such that u$ p B u, where p=t-trace(a^).
A timed forward-backward simulation from A to B is a
relation g over states(A) and N(states(B)) that satisfies:
1. If s # start(A) then there exists S # g[s] such that
Sstart(B).
2. If s$ wa A s and S$ # g[s$], then there exists a set
S # g[s] such that for every u # S there exists u$ # S$ with
u$ p B u, where p=t-trace(a^).
A timed backwardforward simulation from A to B is
a total relation g over states(A) and P(states(B)) that
satisfies:
1. If s # start(A) then for all S # g[s], S & start(B){<.
2. If s$ wa A s and S # g[s], then there exists a set
S$ # g[s$] such that for every u$ # S$ there exists u # S with
u$ p B u, where p=t-trace(a^).
For each of the above simulations, we will refer to the first
condition in the definition as the start condition, and to the
second condition as the transfer condition.
A relation h over states(A) and states(B) is a timed history
relation from A to B if it is a timed forward simulation from
A to B and h&1 is a timed refinement from B to A. A relation
p over states(A) and states(B) is a timed prophecy relation
from A to B if it is a timed backward simulation from A to
B and p&1 is a timed refinement from B to A.
Analogously to Part I, we write AtR B, A
t
F B, etc., to
indicate that there is a timed refinement, timed forward
simulation, etc., from A to B.
Without working out the details, we note here that,
analogously to the untimed case, there is a full corre-
spondence between timed historyprophecy relations and
the obvious notions of timed historyprophecy variables.
We close this section with a technical lemma. The transfer
condition of each simulation definition is stated for
individual steps of A. It is straightforward to deduce a
similar condition for moves rather than steps.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that A and B are timed automata
and s$ p A s.
1. If r is a timed refinement from A to B then
r(s$) p B r(s).
2. If f is a timed forward simulation from A to B and
u$ # f [s$], then there exists a state u # f [s] such that u$ p B u.
3. If b is a timed backward simulation from A to B and
u # b[s], then there exists a state u$ # b[s$] such that u$ p B u.
4. If g is a timed forwardbackward simulation from A to
B and S$ # g[s$], then there exists a set S # g[s] such that for
every u # S there exists u$ # S$ with u$ p B u.
5. If g is a timed backwardforward simulation from A to
B and S # g[s], then there exists a set S$ # g[s$] such that for
every u$ # S$ there exists u # S with u$ p B u.
Proof. Let W be a timed execution fragment from A
such that s$=W } fstate, s=W.lstate, and p=t-trace(W).
All parts are proved by induction on k=n(W), where, as in
the proof of Lemma 3.4, n(W ) is the sum of the number of
nontrivial trajectories and the number of discrete actions
occurring in W. As an example, we prove the result for
timed refinements; the other cases are similar.
Basis. k=0.
Then s$=s, W consists of the trivial trajectory containing
the single state s, and p=(*, 0). Since r(s) (*, 0)B r(s), we have
r(s$) p B r(s).
Basis. k=1.
This case follows easily from the transfer condition in the
definition of a timed refinement.
Inductive step. k>1.
Then W can be written as W1 } W2 , where n(W1)=k&1
and n(W2)=1. Let s" denote W1 } lstate (=W2 } fstate).
Let p1=t-trace(W1) and p2=t-trace(W2). Then s$ 
p1
A s"
and s" 
p2
A s. By inductive hypothesis, r(s$) 
p 1
B r(s") and
r(s") 
p 2
B r(s). By Lemma 2.8, p=p1 } p2 . Then Lemma
2.10(1) implies that r(s$) p B r(s). K
6. TIMED RESULTS FROM UNTIMED RESULTS
In this and the next section we give soundness and com-
pleteness results for the various simulations defined in
Section 5, as well as implication results among them. The
distinction between the results in this section and those in
Section 7 is that the ones given here are all derived from
corresponding results for the untimed case. The statements
of the results in Section 7 are also analogous to results of
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FIG. 1. Classification of basic relations among timed automata.
Part I, but these timed results are not derived from the
untimed results, for instance because they require the con-
struction of an intermediate timed automaton.
Most of the results in this section are presented in the
form of a diagram, Fig. 1. This is the same diagram that
appears in Part I for the untimed setting, except for the t
superscripts.
The machinery needed to prove the results in this section
is developed in Section 6.1. In particular, we define an
untimed automaton called the closure automaton, cl(A), for
every timed automaton A. We then show close corre-
spondences between A and cl(A), involving both external
behavior notions and simulation relations. These corre-
spondences allow us to derive the results in Section 6.2 from
the corresponding results for untimed automata.
6.1. The Closure Automaton
In this section, we define the closure of a timed
automaton, the basic technical device that we will used to
derive results about timed automata from corresponding
results about untimed automata. Section 6.1.1 contains the
definition, Section 6.1.2 gives the relationships between
timed traces of a timed automaton and traces of its closure,
and Section 6.1.3 gives the relationships between timed
simulations between timed automata and simulations
between their closures.
6.1.1. Definition
The closure of a timed automaton A, denoted by cl(A), is
the automaton B given by
v states(B)=states(A),
v start(B)=start(A),
v acts(B)=acts(A), and
v steps(B) consists of steps(A) together with all steps
s$ wd B s, such that s$ 
(*, d )
A s.
Thus, the closure construction augments A by adding new
time-passage steps to short-circuit the effects of any number
of { and time-passage actions of A.
Proposition 6.1. cl(A) is a timed automaton.
6.1.2. Relating Timed and Untimed Traces
In this section, we describe some close connections
between A and cl(A). We begin with a preliminary lemma
showing the relationship between moves of A and of cl(A).
Lemma 6.2. Suppose s$ and s are states of A.
1. If ; is a finite sequence of actions in ext(A) then
s$ =O; cl(A) s if and only if s$ 
t-trace(;)
A s.
2. If p is a finite timed sequence pair over vis(A) then
s$ ===O
trace(p)
cl(A) s if and only if s$ 
p
A s.
Proof. Part 1 is straightforward. Part 2 follows from
Part 1 and Lemma 2.5. K
From this we can prove:
Lemma 6.3. 1. If ; is a finite sequence of actions in
ext(A) then
; # traces*(cl(A)) if and only if t-trace(;) # t-traces*(A).
2. If p is a finite timed sequence pair over vis(A) then
trace(p) # traces*(cl(A)) if and only if p # t-traces*(A).
Proof. We show Part 1. Suppose that ; is a finite
sequence of actions in ext(A), and let p=t-trace(;).
O : Suppose that ; # traces*(cl(A)). Then there exist
s$ # start(cl(A)) and s # states(cl(A)) such that s$ =O; cl(A) s.
Then Lemma 6.2 implies that s$ p A s. This implies that
p # t-traces*(A).
o : Suppose that p # t-traces*(A). Then there exist
s$ # start(A) and s # states(A) such that s$ p A s. Then
Lemma 6.2 implies that s$ =O; cl(A) s. This implies that
; # traces*(cl(A)).
Part 2 follows from Part 1 and Lemma 2.5. K
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A similar result holds for admissible sequences:
Lemma 6.4.
1. If ; is an admissible sequence of actions in ext(A) then
; # traces|(cl(A)) if and only if t-trace(;) # t-traces(A).
2. If p is an admissible timed sequence pair over vis(A)
then
trace(p) # traces|(cl(A)) if and only if p # t-traces(A).
We now show that t-determinism of A corresponds to
determinism of cl(A), and likewise for t-fin and fin.
Lemma 6.5.
1. A is t-deterministic if and only if cl(A) is deterministic.
2. A has t-fin if and only if cl(A) has fin.
Proof. We first prove part 1:
O : Suppose A is t-deterministic. Then, by Lemma 3.2,
all { steps of A are of the form s w{ s. But this means that
cl(A) and A are identical. And thus both A and cl(A) are
deterministic by Lemma 3.1.
o : Suppose cl(A) is deterministic. Then all { steps of
cl(A) are of the form s w{ s. But since cl(A) is obtained from
A by adding time-passage steps only, also all { steps of A are
of the form s w{ s. This again implies that cl(A) and A are
identical. And thus both A and cl(A) are t-deterministic by
Lemma 3.1.
Next we prove part 2:
O : Suppose A has t-fin. Then start(A) is finite and
hence start(cl(A)) is finite. Suppose s$ is a state of cl(A) and
; is a finite sequence over ext(cl(A)). We show that the set
S=[s | s$ =O; cl(A) s] is finite. Suppose s # S. Then Lemma
6.2 implies that s # U, where U=[u | s$ t-trace(;)A u]. Thus
SU. Since A has t-fin, U is finite. Thus S is finite, as
required.
o : Suppose that cl(A) has fin. Then start(cl(A)) is
finite and hence start(A) is finite. Suppose s$ is a state
of A and p is a finite timed sequence pair over vis(A).
We show that the set S=[s | s$ p A s] is finite. Suppose
s # S. Then Lemma 6.2 implies that s # U, where U=
[u | s$ ==O
trace(p)
cl(A) u]. Since cl(A) has fin, U is finite. Thus S is
finite, as required. K
Now we relate finite timed trace inclusion for timed
automata to ordinary finite trace inclusion for their closure
automata.
Lemma 6.6. At
*T
B  cl(A)
*T
cl(B).
Proof. O : Suppose that ; # traces*(cl(A)). Then Lemma
6.3 implies that p # t-traces*(A), where p=t-trace(;). The
hypothesis then implies that also p # t-traces*(B). Again by
Lemma 6.3, we have ; # traces*(cl(B)).
o : Suppose that p # t-traces*(A). Then Lemma 6.3
implies that ; # traces*(cl(A)), where ;=trace(p). The
hypothesis then implies that also ; # traces*(cl(B)). Again
by Lemma 6.3, we have p # t-traces*(B). K
We can also obtain a one-way relationship between
general timed trace inclusion for timed automaton and
general trace inclusion for their closure automata.
Lemma 6.7. If cl(A)T cl(B) then AtT B.
Proof. Suppose cl(A)T cl(B). Then certainly cl(A)*Tcl(B), so by Lemma 6.6, At
*T
B. It remains to show
that AtT B. For this, suppose that p # t-traces
(A).
Then Lemma 6.4 implies that ; # traces|(cl(A)), where ;=
trace(p). The hypothesis then implies that ; # traces|(cl(B)).
Again by Lemma 6.4, we have p # t-traces(B). K
Example 6.8. The converse of Lemma 6.7 does not
hold in general. For a counterexample, let B be a timed
automaton that nondeterministically chooses a positive
natural number n, then performs action a at times
1&2&1, 1&2&2, ..., 1&2&n, and then idles forever, allow-
ing time to pass. Since each finite timed execution can be
extended to an admissible one, B is feasible; since it has
infinitely many start states B has infinite invisible nondeter-
minism. Let A be the same as B, except that it may also
choose | at the beginning, in which case it subsequently
performs action a at times 1&2&1, 1&2&2, ..., 1&2&n, ...
Timed automaton A is not feasible because by choosing |
it reaches a state from which only a Zeno execution, and no
admissible execution, is possible. Timed automata A and B
have the same timed traces, but cl(A) also has an infinite
trace (a, 1&2&1), (a, 1&2&2), ..., (a, 1&2&n), ... which
cl(B) does not have.
It turns out that the converse of Lemma 6.7 does hold if
B has t-fin.
Lemma 6.9. Suppose B has t-fin. Then cl(A)T cl(B) 
AtT B.
Proof.
cl(A)T cl(B)  (by Lemma 6.5, and Proposition 2.6 of Part I)
cl(A)
*T
cl(B)  (by Lemma 6.6)
At
*T
B  (by Proposition 4.4)
AtT B. K
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Finally, we obtain a corollary that relates timed trace
inclusions for timed automata to simulations for their
closures.
Corollary 6.10. The following statements are equiv-
alent.
1. At
*T
B.
2. cl(A)FB cl(B).
3. cl(A)BF cl(B).
If B has t-fin then also the following statements are equivalent
to each other and to the three statements above.
1. AtT B.
2. cl(A)iFB cl(B).
Proof.
At
*T
B  (by Lemma 6.6)
cl(A)
*T
cl(B)  (by Theorems 4.5 and 4.6 of Part I)
cl(A)FB cl(B)  (by Proposition 4.10 of Part I)
cl(A)BF cl(B).
If B has t-fin then
At
*T
B O (by Lemma 6.6)
cl(A)
*T
cl(B) O (by Lemma 6.5, and Theorem 4.6 of Part I)
cl(A)iFB cl(B) O (by Theorem 4.5 of Part I)
cl(A)T cl(B) O (by Lemma 6.7)
AtT B O At*T
B. K
Corollary 6.10 already provides one method for proving
that the finite timed traces of a timed automaton A are
included among those of another timed automaton B:
produce an ordinary forward-backward or backward
forward simulation from cl(A) to cl(B). Of course, any
simpler type of simulation from Part I, such as a forward or
backward simulation, will do as well. Similarly, Corollary
6.10 provides a method for proving that all the timed traces
of A are included among those of B, in case B has t-fin.
This approach is analogous to that followed for Milner’s
CCS [49], where the problem of establishing a weak
bisimulation is reduced to the problem of finding a strong
bisimulation. Another example of this approach appears in
[38], where the problem of showing inclusion of timed
behaviors of certain kinds of timed automata is reduced to
that of proving inclusion between sets of admissible
behaviors of certain derived IO automata.
However, this is not the approach we emphasize in this
paper. Instead, we will use the closure automata as a techni-
cal device to help us prove soundness, completeness and
implication results for the new timed simulations defined in
Section 5. For this, we proceed in the next subsection to
relate timed simulations to corresponding untimed simula-
tions for closure automata.
6.1.3. Relating Timed and Untimed Simulations
In Section 6.1.2, we showed that (under certain finiteness
conditions) inclusion of timed traces for timed automata is
equivalent to inclusion of ordinary traces for the closures
of these automata. Now we demonstrate strong relation-
ships between timed simulations for timed automata, and
ordinary simulations for the closures of these automata.
Lemma 6.11. A relation from states(A) to states(B) is a
timed refinement from A to B if and only if it is a refinement
from cl(A) to cl(B). Moreover, the same correspondence
also holds for forward simulations, backward simulations,
forwardbackward simulations, backwardforward simula-
tions, history relations, and prophecy relations.
Proof. We prove the result for refinements.
O : Suppose that r is a timed refinement from A to B.
We show that r is a refinement from cl(A) to cl(B). The start
condition carries over immediately; we consider the step
condition. Suppose that s$ wa cl(A) s. Then s$ =O
a^
cl(A) s and so
Lemma 6.2 implies that s$ p A s, where p=t-trace(a^). Since
r is a timed refinement, Lemma 5.1 implies that r(s$) p B r(s).
Then Lemma 6.2 implies that r(s$) ===Otrace(p) cl(B) r(s). But case
analysis based on whether a is a visible, internal or time-
passage action shows that trace(p)=a^, so this is as needed.
o : Suppose that r is a refinement from cl(A) to cl(B).
We show that r is a timed refinement from A to B. The start
condition carries over immediately; we consider the step
condition. Suppose that s$ wa A s. Then s$ w
a
cl(A) s, by
definition of cl(A). Since r is a refinement, we have that
r(s$) =Oa^ cl(B) r(s). Then Lemma 6.2 implies that r(s$) 
p
B r(s),
where p=t-trace(a^), as needed.
The proofs for forward, backward, forwardbackward
and backwardforward simulations are entirely analogous,
using the appropriate parts of Lemma 5.1. The results for
history and prophecy relations follow from those for for-
ward simulations, backward simulations, and refinements. K
Therefore, we have:
Corollary 6.12. Suppose X represents any of [R, F, B,
iB, FB, iFB, BF, iBF, H, P, iP]. Then AtX B if and only if
cl(A)X cl(B).
Proposition 6.13. The relations tR , 
t
F , 
t
B , 
t
iB ,
tFB , 
t
iFB , 
t
BF , 
t
H , 
t
P , and 
t
iP are all preorders.
(However, tiBF is not a preorder.)
Proof. This follows from Corollary 6.12, since the
corresponding untimed simulations are preorders. The same
counterexample that we used to show that iBF is not a
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preorder (the automata A11 and A12 of Example 4.11 in Part
I) can be used to show that tiBF is not a preorder. One can
turn the automata from this counterexample into feasible
timed automata via the patient construction of [41]. This
construction introduces arbitrary time delays at each state
by simply attaching, for each d, steps s wd s to each
state s. K
6.2. Soundness and Implication Results for Timed
Automaton Simulation Relations
In this section, we give those results about timed auto-
mata that follow from corresponding results about untimed
automata, using the results in the previous two sections. We
present most of these results in a single theorem, which is
entirely analogous to a classification given in Section 7 of
Part I.
Theorem 6.14. Suppose M, N # [T, VT, R, F, (i)B,
(i)FB, (i)BF, H, (i)P], where the (i) indicates that i is
optional.
1. If there is a path from tM to 
t
N in Fig. 1 consisting
of thin arrows only, and if AtM B, then A
t
N B.
2. If there is a path from tM to 
t
N consisting of thin
andor thick arrows, if AtM B and if B has t-fin, then
AtN B.
Proof. Note that Fig. 1 is identical to Fig. 6 of Part I,
which gives an overview of the relationships in the untimed
case, except for the superscripts t. It is enough to prove:
1. If there is a thin arrow from tM to 
t
N and if
AtM B, then A
t
N B.
2. If there is a thick arrow from tM to 
t
N, if A
t
M B
and if B has t-fin, then AtN B.
For part 1, suppose that there is a thin arrow from tM to
tN and that A
t
M B. If [M, N] & [T, VT]=<, then
Corollary 6.12 implies that cl(A)M cl(B). Then the
corresponding result for the untimed case implies that
cl(A)N cl(B), which implies by Corollary 6.12 that
AtN B, as needed. There are four remaining thin arrows to
consider.
1. M=iFB and N=T. Corollary 6.12 implies that
cl(A)iFB cl(B). The untimed result implies that
cl(A)T cl(B), which implies by Lemma 6.7 that AtT B.
2. M=T and N=VT. This is immediate from the
definitions.
3. M=VT and N=FB. Corollary 6.10 implies that
cl(A)FB cl(B), which implies by Corollary 6.12 that
AtFB B.
4. M=FB and N=VT. Corollary 6.12 implies that
cl(A)FB cl(B), which implies by Corollary 6.10 that
At
*T
B.
For part 2, suppose that there is a thick arrow from tM to
tN , that A
t
M B and that B has t-fin. There are only two
thick arrows to consider:
1. M=VT and N=T. This follows from Proposition 4.4.
2. M=T and N=iFB. Corollary 6.10 implies that
cl(A)iFB cl(B), which implies by Corollary 6.12 that
AtiFB B. K
In order to show that all the inclusions are strict, one can
use essentially the same counterexamples as in the untimed
setting. Again one can turn these untimed counterexamples
into feasible timed automata via the patient construction of
[41], i.e., by introducing arbitrary time delays at each state
by attaching, for each d, steps s wd s to each state s.
We close this section with three more results that are
derived from the analogous results for the untimed case
using the correspondences.
Theorem 6.15 (Partial Completness of Timed Forward
Simulations). Suppose B is t-deterministic and A t
*T
B.
Then AtF B.
Proof. By Lemma 6.5(1), cl(B) is deterministic, and by
Lemma 6.6, cl(A)
*T
cl(B). Thus by the partial complete-
ness result for forward simulations (Theorem 3.11, Part I),
cl(A)F cl(B). Then Corollary 6.12 allows us to conclude
that AtF B, as required. K
Proposition 6.16. Suppose all states of A are reachable,
B is t-deterministic and AtB B. Then AR B.
Proof. Lemma 6.2 implies that all states of cl(A) are
reachable, Lemma 6.5 implies that cl(B) is deterministic,
and Corollary 6.12 implies that cl(A)B cl(B). By Proposi-
tion 3.19 of Part I, the untimed version of the fact we are
proving, cl(A)R cl(B). Then Corollary 6.12 allows us to
conclude that AtR B, as required. K
Proposition 6.17. Suppose all states of A are reachable,
B has t-fin, and AtB B. Then A
t
iB B.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 6.16. K
7. REMAINING RESULTS FOR TIMED AUTOMATA
In Section 6, we showed how some simple corresponden-
ces enable most of the results for untimed automata to be
extended to timed automata. In this section, we consider
what happens to all the other results of Part I. We begin
with the results about untimed automata that do not extend
in this way but are nonetheless true. In Section 7.1 we pre-
sent partial completeness results that involve t-forests.
These do not carry over using the correspondences because
the closure of a t-forest need not be a forest: in a t-forest
(and hence also in its closure) a state may have multiple
incoming time-passage steps, something that is not
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allowed in a forest. In Sections 7.2 and 7.3, we present
results that assert the existence of timed automata with par-
ticular properties, including the completeness results for the
combination of timed forward and timed backward simula-
tions and the AbadiLamport completeness result. We
prove all of these results directly for timed automata. In
most cases, the proof is analogous to the corresponding
proof in Part I. Finally, in Section 7.4, we demonstrate that
the one remaining result of Part I, Proposition 3.12, is not
true in the timed setting.
7.1. Partial Completeness Results for t-Forests
Theorem 7.1 (Partial Completeness of Timed Refine-
ments). Suppose A is a t-forest, B is t-deterministic, and
At
*T
B. Then AtR B.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.5 in Part I.
Define r ] t-after(B) b t-past(A). Lemma 3.5 and the fact
that t-traces*(A)t-traces*(B) together imply that r is a
function from states(A) to states(B). We claim that r is a
timed refinement from A to B.
The start condition is straightforward.
For the transfer condition, suppose that s$ wa A s.
Let p=t-trace(a^); then s$ p A s. We must show that
r(s$) p B r(s). Since A is a forest, there exist timed traces q$
and q leading to s$ and s, respectively. Lemma 2.10 implies
that q$ } p leads from a start state of A to s. Since A is a forest
and q and q$ } p both lead to s, it must be that q$ } p=q.
By definition of r, we have u0 
q
B r(s) for some start state
u0 of B. Then Lemma 2.10 implies that there is a state u of
B such that u0 
q$
B u and u 
p
B r(s). Since q$ leads from a
start state of A to s$, the definition of r then implies that
u=r(s$). Thus, r(s$) p B r(s), as needed. K
Theorem 7.2 (Partial Completeness of Timed Backward
Simulations). Suppose A is a t-forest and At
*T
B. Then
1. AtB B, and
2. if B has t-fin then AtiB B.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.18 in
Part I. We define a relation b over states(A) and states(B).
For a given state s of A, Lemma 3.5 implies that there is a
unique timed trace leading to s, say p. Define
b[s]=[u | _W # t-execs*(B): t-trace(W )=p,
W.lstate=u, and \W$ # t-execs*(B) :
[W$OW  t-trace(W$){p]].
Lemma 3.5 and the fact that t-traces*(A)t-traces*(B)
imply that relation b is total. The start condition follows as
in the proof of Theorem 3.18 in Part I.
For the transfer condition, suppose that s$ wa A s,
u # b[s], and p=t-trace(a^); then s$ p A s. We define
u$ # b[s$] so that u$ p B u. As in the proof of Proposition 7.1,
we obtain timed traces q$ and q leading to s$ and s respec-
tively, and conclude that q$ } p=q. Since u # b[s], we have
u0 
q
B u for some start state u0 of B. Then Lemma 2.10
implies that there is a state u$ of B such that u0 
q$
B u$ and
u$ p B u. Moreover, it is possible to select u$ in a ‘‘minimal’’
way so that there is an execution from u0 to u$ with timed
trace q$ that does not end with a { step. Since q$ leads from
a start state of A to s$, the definition of b implies that
u$ # b[s$]. This suffices.
Lemma 3.5 implies that if B has t-fin then relation b is
image-finite. K
7.2. Combined Timed Forward and Backward Simulations
In this subsection, we give the completeness results for the
combination of timed forward and timed backward simula-
tions. In order to prove these results, we use variants of the
classic subset construction from automata theory, and a
variant of the dual historization construction of Klarlund
and Schneider [29].
The backward power of a timed automaton A, notation
b-power(A), is the automaton B defined by
v states(B)=N(states(A)),
v start(B)=N(start(A)),
v acts(B)=acts(A), and
v for S$, S # states(B) and a # acts(B),
S$ wa B S  \s # S _s$ # S$ : s$ 
t-trace(a^)
A s.
The finitary backward power of A, notation fin-b-power(A),
is defined in exactly the same way, except that instead of all
non-empty subsets of states(A) and start(A) only the finite
non-empty subsets are used. The forward power or historiza-
tion of A, notation f-power(A), is the automaton F defined
by
v states(F )=P(states(A)),
v start(F )=[Sstates(A) | S & start(A){<],
v acts(F )=acts(A), and
v for S$, S # states(F ) and a # acts(F ),
S$ wa F S  \s$ # S$ _s # S : s$ 
t-trace(a^)
A s.
Lemma 7.3. Suppose B=b-power(A), I=fin-b-power(A),
and F=f-power(A). Then B, I, and F are timed automata and
1. AtR B and B
t
B A,
2. AtR I and I
t
iB A,
3. AtR F and F
t
F A.
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Proof. First we show that B satisfies axioms S1 and S2.
For S1, suppose that S$ wd B S" and S" w
d$
B S. Then
\s" # S" _s$ # S$ : s$ (*, d )A s", and
\s # S _s" # S": s" (*, d$)A s.
It follows, using Lemma 2.10, that
\s # S _s$ # S$ : s$ (*, d+d$)A s,
i.e., that S$ wwd+d$ B S, as needed for S1.
For S2, suppose that S$ wd B S. Define w: [0, d] 
states(B) as follows: let w(0)=S$, w(d )=S, and for any t,
0<t<d, let w(t)=[u # states(A) | _s$ # S$: s$ (*, t)A u]. Sup-
pose 0t1<t2d ; we must show that w(t1) ww
t2&t1
B w(t2).
There are three nontrivial cases:
1. 0=t1<t2<d. We must show that S$ w
t 2
B w(t2), that
is, that
\u # w(t2) _s$ # S$: s$ 
(*, t 2)
A u.
But this is immediate from the definition of w(t2).
2. 0<t1<t2=d. We must show that w(t1) ww
d&t1
B S,
that is, that
\s # S _u # w(t1): u 
(*, d&t 1)
A s.
So suppose that s # S. Since S$ wd B S, there exists a state
s$ # S$ such that s$ (*, d )A s. Then Lemma 2.10 implies that
there exists u such that s$ (*, t 1)A u and u 
(*, d&t1)
A s. This u
satisfies all our requirements.
3. 0<t1<t2<d. The argument is similar to that for
Case 2.
The mapping that relates to each state s of A the state [s]
of B is a timed refinement from A to B; hence AtR B. The
mapping that relates each state S of B to all its elements is
a timed backward simulation from B to A; hence BtB A.
The proofs for I and F are similar to those for B, except
for the proof that I satisfies axiom S2. Suppose that
S$ wd I S. Then there exists, for each s # S, a finite timed
execution fragment Ws of A with Ws } fstate # S$,
t-trace(Ws)=(*, d) and Ws } lstate=s. Define w: [0, d] 
states(I ) as follows: let w(0)=S$, w(d )=S, and for any t,
0<t<d, let w(t) be the finite set which, for each s # S, con-
tains the last state of the shortest prefix of Ws with limit
time t. Then it is routine to prove that w is a trajectory for
S$ wd I S. K
Theorem 7.4.
1. AtFB B  (_C : A
t
F C
t
B B).
2. AtiFB B  (_C : A
t
F C
t
iB B).
3. AtBF B  (_C : A
t
B C
t
F B).
4. AtiBF B  (_C : A
t
iB C
t
F B).
Proof. The proof of the implications ‘‘ o ’’ is easy. We
sketch the proof of ‘‘ O ’’ in 3 and 4. The proofs of ‘‘ O ’’ in
1 and 2 are similar.
Let g be a timed backward-forward simulation from A to
B, which is image finite if AtiBF B. Let C=f-power(B).
Then it is straightforward to check that g is also a timed
backward simulation from A to C (and is image-finite if
AtiBF B). Moreover, Lemma 7.3 gives C
t
F B. K
It is interesting to note the difference between the above
proof of Theorem 7.4 and the corresponding proofs of
Theorems 4.1 and 4.8 in Part I. In those proofs the inter-
mediate automata are ‘‘smaller’’ than the power construc-
tions that we use here, since as states they only contain
those sets of states of B that are in the range of g. It is not
possible to use the constructions from Part I here because in
general the resulting automata do not satisfy the trajectory
axiom S2. However, we could have used the power con-
structions in Part I as well. In fact, one can even argue that
in some sense this would have been less ad-hoc.
Theorem 7.5 (Completeness of Timed Forward and
Timed Backward Simulations). Suppose At
*T
B. Then
1. _C : AtF C
t
B B,
2. if B has t-fin then _C : AtF C
t
iB B, and
3. _C: AtB C
t
F B.
Proof. Immediate from Theorems 6.14 and 7.4.
Parts 1 and 2 can alternatively be shown using a proof
analogous to that of Theorem 3.22 of Part I. Let
C=t-can(t-beh(A)). By Lemma 4.8, C is a t-deterministic
t-forest and A#t
*T
C. Since C is t-deterministic, AtF C
by partial completeness of timed forward simulations
(Theorem 6.15), and because C is a t-forest, CtB B follows
by partial completeness of timed backward simulations
(Theorem 7.2(1)) Similarly, if B has t-fin then CtiB B
follows by Theorem 7.2(2). K
7.3. Timed History and Prophecy Relations
In this section, we present additional results about the
timed auxiliary variable constructions.
7.3.1. Timed History Relations
We begin with a timed analogue to the unfolding con-
struction of Part I.
The timed unfolding of A, notation t-unfold(A), is the
timed automaton B defined by
v states(B)=t-execs*(A),
v start(B)=[0, 0]  start(A),
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v acts(B)=acts(A), and
v for W$, W # states(B), d # R+ and a # acts(B)&R+,
W$ wd B W  _w: W$ } w=W 7 w.ltime=d
W$ wa B W  W$aw$=W,
where w$ is the trivial trajectory that maps 0 to W.lstate.
We leave it to the reader to verify that t-unfold(A) is a
timed automaton.
Proposition 7.6. t-unfold(A) is a t-forest and AtH
t-unfold(A).
Proof. Using Lemma 3.4 it follows easily that
t-unfold(A) is a t-forest. The function .lstate, which maps
each finite timed execution of A to its last state, is a timed
refinement from t-unfold(A) to A, and the relation .lstate&1
is a timed forward simulation from A to t-unfold(A).
Thus, .lstate&1 is a timed history relation from A to
t-unfold(A). K
We are now in a position to prove a timed version of
Sistla’s [57] completeness result.
Theorem 7.7 (Completeness of Timed History Relations
and Timed Backward Simulations). Suppose At
*T
B.
Then
1. _C : AtH C
t
B B, and
2. if B has t-fin then _C : AtH C
t
iB B.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 5.6 in Part I;
choose C=t-unfold(A). K
We next define a notion of timed superposition, analogous
to the notion of superposition in Part I. Suppose R is a
relation over states(A) and states(B) with R & (start(A)_
start(B)){<. The timed superposition t-sup(A, B, R) of B
onto A via R is the timed automaton C given by
v states(C )=R,
v start(C)=R & (start(A)_start(B)),
v acts(C)=acts(A) & acts(B), and
v for (s$, u$), (s, u) # states(C ) and a # acts(C),
(s$, u$) wa C (s, u)  s$ 
p
A s 7 u$ 
p
B u, where p=t-trace(a^).
Again we leave it to the reader to check that t-sup(A, B, R)
is a timed automaton.
Theorem 7.8. AtF B  (_C : A
t
H C
t
R B).
Proof. Suppose AtF B. Let f be a timed forward
simulation from A to B, let C=t-sup(A, B, f ), and let ?1
and ?2 be the projection functions that map states of C to
their first and second components, respectively. Then it is
easy to check that ?&11 is a timed history relation from A to
C and ?2 is a timed refinement from C to B.
The reverse implication also follows via a standard
argument. K
7.3.2. Timed Prophecy Relations
Finally, we describe the additional results about timed
prophecy relations. We give a timed analogue to the guess
construction of Part I. This can be regarded as a dual to the
timed unfolding construction of the previous subsection.
The timed guess of A, notation t-guess(A), is the timed
automaton B defined by
v states(B)=t-frag*(A),
v start(B)=t-execs*(A),
v acts(B)=acts(A), and
v for W$, W # states(B), d # R+, and a # acts(B)&R+,
W$ wd B W  _w: W$=w } W 7 w . ltime=d
W$ wa B W  W$=w$aW,
where w$ is the trivial trajectory that maps 0 to W$. fstate.
As before, we leave it to the reader to verify that t-guess(A)
is a timed automaton.
Proposition 7.9. AtP t-guess(A).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 7.6. K
Theorem 7.10.
1. AtB B  (_C : A
t
P C
t
R B).
2. AtiB B  (_C : A
t
iP C
t
R B).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7.8, using timed
backward simulations instead of timed forward simula-
tions. K
We finish this subsection with a dual version of Sistla’s
completeness result [57] and variants of the completeness
results of Abadi and Lamport [1].
Theorem 7.11 (Completeness of Timed Prophecy Rela-
tions and Timed Forward Simulations). At
*T
B O
_C : AtP C
t
F B.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 5.17 in Part I.
K
Theorem 7.12 (Completeness of Timed History
Prophecy Relations and Refinements). Suppose At
*T
B.
Then
1. _C, D: AtH C
t
P D
t
R B.
2. If B has t-fin then _C, D: AtH C
t
iP D
t
R B.
3. _C, D: AtP C
t
H D
t
R B.
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Proof. Analogous to the proofs of Theorems 5.18 and
5.19 in Part I. K
7.4. A Result That Does Not Carry Over
Proposition 3.12 of Part I does not carry over to our
timed setting, i.e., there exist timed automata A and B such
that A is a t-forest and AtF B but not A
t
R B.
Example 7.13. Timed automaton A may perform a
single visible action a at any rational time, and then stops.
Timed automaton B may only perform a single action a at
integer times. However, whereas A measures time with a
‘‘perfect clock,’’ B measures time with a clock that may run
either too slow or too fast, in an arbitrary fashion. The set
of states of A is R0_[T, F], with (0, T) the initial state,
and there are steps
v (t, T) wd (t+d, T), for each t # R0 and d # R+;
v (t, T) wa (t, F), for each t # Q0.
The set of states of B is also R0_[T, F], with (0, T) the
initial state. The steps of B are
v (t, T) wd (t$, T), for all t, t$ # R0 with t<t$ and all
d # R+;
v (t, T) wa (t, F), for each t # N.
Using Lemma 3.4 it is easy to see that A is a t-forest. Also,
it is easy to check that the relation f given by
f ] [((t, b), (t$, b$)) | t # R0, t$ # N and b=b$]
is a timed forward simulation from A to B. However, there
does not exist a timed refinement from A to B. The proof is
by contradiction. Suppose that r is a timed refinement.
Then, by the start condition of a timed refinement, r maps
the start state (0, T) of A to the start state (0, T) of B. The
state (1, T) of A has an outgoing a step, so it must be
mapped to a state of B that also has an outgoing a step,
i.e., a state (n, T) for some n # N. Since A has a step
(0, T) w1 (1, T), but B does not have a step (0, T) w1 (0, T),
it follows using the transfer condition of a timed refinement
that n>0. Let, for 0i2n, si be the image under r of state
(i2n, T) of A. By definition of A and by the transfer condi-
tion of a timed refinement, si ww
12n si+1 , for all i<2n.
Further all si must be of the form (mi , T), for some mi # N.
By definition of B, this means that 0=m0<m1<
m2< } } } <m2n&1<m2n=n. This is a contradiction, as
there are only n&1 naturals strictly between 0 and n, and
not 2n&1.
An interesting question (wide open to us) is to come up
with some plausible additional axioms for timed automata,
such that in the resulting setting all the results on simula-
tions that we proved in Part I of this paper do carry over.
8. INCLUDING INVARIANTS
We show how to introduce invariants into the timed
simulations, just as we introduced them into the untimed
simulations in Section 6 of Part I. An invariant of a timed
automaton A is defined to be a superset of the set of
reachable states of A, i.e., a property that is true of all the
reachable states of A. Let A and B be timed automata with
invariants IA and IB , respectively.
A weak timed refinement from A to B, with respect to IA
and IB , is a function r: states(A)  states(B) that satisfies:
1. If s # start(A) then r(s) # start(B).
2. If s$ wa A s, s$, s # IA , and r(s$) # IB , then r(s$) 
p
B r(s),
where p=t-trace(a^).
A weak timed forward simulation from A to B, with
respect to IA and IB , is a relation f over states(A) and
states(B) that satisfies:
1. If s # start(A) then f [s] & start(B){<.
2. If s$ wa A s, s$, s # IA , and u$ # f [s$] & IB , then there
exists a state u # f [s] such that u$ p B u, where
p=t-trace(a^).
A weak timed backward simulation from A to B, with
respect to IA and IB , is a relation b over states(A) and
states(B) that satisfies:
1. If s # start(A) then b[s] & IBstart(B).
2. If s$ wa A s, s$, s # IA , and u # b[s] & IB , then there
exists a state u$ # b[s$] & IB such that u$ 
p
B u, where
p=t-trace(a^).
3. If s # IA then b[s] & IB{<.
A weak timed forwardbackward simulation from A to B,
with respect to IA and IB , is a relation g over states(A) and
P(states(B)) that satisfies:
1. If s # start(A) then there exists S # g[s] such that
S & IBstart(B).
2. If s$ wa A s, s$, s # IA , and S$ # g[s$], then there exists
a set S # g[s] such that for every u # S & IB there exists
u$ # S$ & IB such that u$ 
p
B u, where p=t-trace(a^).
3. If s # IA and S # g[s] then S & IB{<.
A weak timed backwardforward simulation from A to B,
with respect to IA and IB , is a relation g over states(A) and
P(states(B)) that satisfies:
1. If s # start(A) then, for all S # g[s], S & start(B){<.
2. If s$ wa A s, s$, s # IA , and S # g[s], then there exists a
set S$ # g[s$] such that for every u$ # S$ & IB there exists a
u # S & IB such that u$ 
p
B u, where p=t-trace(a^).
3. If s # IA then g[s]{<.
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A relation h over states(A) and states(B) is a weak timed
history relation from A to B, with respect to IA and IB ,
provided that h is a weak timed forward simulation from A
to B, with respect to IA and IB , and h&1 is a weak timed
refinement from B to A, with respect to IB and IA .
A relation p over states(A) and states(B) is a weak timed
prophecy relation from A to B, with respect to IA and IB ,
provided that p is a weak timed backward simulation from
A to B, with respect to IA and IB , and p&1 is a weak timed
refinement from B to A, with respect to IB and IA .
We write AtwR B, A
t
wF B, A
t
wB B, A
t
wiB B,
AtwFB B, A
t
wiFB B, A
t
wBF B, A
t
wiBF B, A
t
wH B,
AtwP B and A
t
wiP B to denote the existence of a weak
refinement, weak forward simulation, weak backward
simulation, weak image-finite backward simulation, etc.,
from A to B, with respect to some invariants IA and IB .
Proposition 8.1. The relations twR , 
t
wF , 
t
wB ,
twiB , 
t
wFB , 
t
wiFB , 
t
wBF , 
t
wH , 
t
wP , and 
t
wiP are all
preorders. (However, twiBF is not a preorder.)
Theorem 8.2 (Soundness of Weak Simulations).
1. If AtwR B, A
t
wF B, A
t
wiB B, A
t
wiFB B,
AtwiBF B, A
t
wH B, or A
t
wiP B, then A
t
T B.
2. If AtwB B, A
t
wFB B, A
t
wBF B, or A
t
wP B, then
At
*T
B.
9. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have presented an automata-theoretic
model for timing-based systems, and have used it to develop
a variety of simulation proof techniques for such systems.
These include timed refinements, timed forward and back-
ward simulations and combinations thereof, and timed
history and prophecy relations. These techniques are
analogous to those described in Part I, [44], for untimed
systems. As in that paper, we present basic results for all of
the simulations, including soundness and completeness
results. The development is organized so that the proofs are
based on the results of Part I. In fact, we have shown that
all the results of Part I carry over to Part II, except for
Proposition 3.12.
The definitions of timed automata and their simulations
involve many choices, such as the choice of the basic axioms
for time-passage steps, whether non-time-passage steps
have nonzero duration or are instantaneous, whether
instantaneous time-passage steps are allowed, whether
or not automata are required to have finitely many (or
countably many) states, whether time-passage should be
represented absolutely or incrementally, what the notion of
external behavior should be, whether the simulations
should require state reachability, etc. Most choices either
lead to longer proofs (see for instance an earlier version of
this paper [43] in which time-passage was represented
absolutely) or do not yield all the properties in this paper.
Our notion of a timed automaton is related to the models
of Merritt, et al. [48] and of Lynch and Attiya [38].
However, these models have more structure than ours, since
they assume that the system being modelled is describable in
terms of a collection of separate tasks, each with associated
upper and lower bounds on its speed. Also, the model of
[48] includes treatment of liveness, whereas our model does
not. The absence of liveness considerations makes our
model simpler; moreover, we do not lose much power
because many properties of practical interest for timing-
based systems can be expressed as safety properties, given
the admissibility assumption that time increases without
bound (cf. [24]). Lynch and Attiya [38] also extend
simulation techniques to timing-based systems. That work,
however, only considers forward simulations. The extra task
structure of the model of Lynch and Attiya supports the
development of a useful progress measure proof method,
which we do not develop here. On the other hand, the basic
theorems about forward simulations that appear in [38]
are stated in a setting that has more structure than is really
necessary for those theorems.
Lynch and Vaandrager [41] show how a whole class of
process algebraic operators can be defined on timed
automata using the general notion of action transducers.
Bosscher, Polak, and Vaandrager [12] define a language of
linear hybrid systems, inspired by the work of [5, 8], and
provide it with a semantics in terms of timed automata. Our
timed automata can also be used to define the semantics of
the timed safety automata of Alur and Dill [7, 26]. In the
latter model a finite state restriction is used in order to
enable the use of effective model-checking methods, some-
thing which is of course not possible in our much more
general model.
By using our timed automata model as a common seman-
tic basis for several other models for timing-based systems,
we get into a situation where we can easily use a variety
of formal proof methods, including assertional methods,
algebraic methods, and finite-state state exploration
(‘‘model-checking’’) methods. These methods are usable
individually or in combination. It remains to further
develop the various proof methods for timed automata. In
particular, we are interested in extending the methods of
process algebra to our timed automaton model. Our paper
[41] contains the beginning of such work, including defini-
tions of interesting operators on timed automata, and
proofs of substitutivity results for the timed trace semantics,
but it remains to provide useful algebraic laws for reasoning
about the operators.
Our timed simulations have already been used extensively
elsewhere [12, 23, 32, 3438, 45, 58, 60] for verification of
timed algorithms and systems. More work is needed in
applying timed simulations to additional practical verifica-
tion examples. In particular, nearly all of the examples that
have been carried out so far involve refinements, forward
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simulations and history variables. Only [58, 32] involve
backward simulations and combinations of forward and
backward simulations.
Finally, although the timed automaton model presented
here is very general, it has become clear that there are at
least three ways in which it can be extended: to include
treatment of liveness properties, to include probabilistic
transitions, and to include treatment of hybrid systems,
including continuously-communicating components. Some
work on integrating liveness into the present model appears
in [16], and work on integrating probabilistic transitions
appears in [39, 3, 56]. Both liveness and probabilities intro-
duce their own sets of additional proof methods, e.g., tem-
poral logic and Markov analysis. In [12], it has been shown
how linear hybrid systems can be defined in terms of our
timed automata. It remains to develop the treatment of
general hybrid systems, and to integrate all three extensions,
with their proof tools, into a sensibly coordinated whole.
APPENDIX A: OTHER AXIOMS
FOR TIMED AUTOMATA
We consider the relationship between axioms S2 and S2$,
as defined in Section 2.1. The relationship between the two
axioms is also investigated in [28]. Define a semi-timed
automaton to be a timed automaton, except that it does not
have to satisfy S2, but only the weaker (and simpler) axiom
S2$. It is immediate from the definition of a trajectory that
each timed automaton is semi-timed. In this appendix, we
consider the reverse implication.
A.1. Time Determinism
In the original paper [61] of Wang in which the axiom
S2$ is proposed, the axiom of time determinacy is also intro-
duced. In our setting this axiom can be formulated as
follows:
TD. If s wd s$ and s wd s", then s$=s".
Axiom TD says that time is deterministic in the sense
that, after a certain amount of time has elapsed since the
system arrived in some state, the new state is uniquely deter-
mined provided no internal or visible action has taken
place. We say that a semi-timed automaton is time deter-
ministic if it satisfies axiom TD. The following theorem is
easy to prove.
Theorem A.1. Each time deterministic semi-timed
automaton is a timed automaton.
Thus, Wang’s axiom S2$ is equivalent to the trajectory
axiom S2 in a context where the time determinacy axiom
TD is assumed. In our timed automaton model we do not
require the axiom TD: we find it unnatural to allow non-
determinism for discrete actions but not for time-passage
actions. As pointed out in [12], time nondeterministic
timed automata arise naturally in the semantics of linear
hybrid systems, for instance in the modelling of drifting
clocks. Also, several of the constructions in this paper, such
as the f-power, b-power, and superposition construction,
introduce time nondeterminism.
A.2. Countable Time Domains
One way to obtain equivalence between timed and semi-
timed automata is to change the underlying time domain. In
this paper, we have chosen elements of the set R0 of non-
negative real numbers as time-passage actions for timed
automata. Instead, we could have proved all our results for
automata parameterized with an arbitrary time domain as in
[27, 53, 28]. A time domain D=(T, +, 0) consists of a set
T of points in time, equipped with a binary operator + and
constant 0 such that, for all t, u, v # T,
T1. t+0=0+t=t
T2. t+(u+v)=(t+u)+v
T3. t+u=t+v O u=v
T4. t+u=0 O t=u=0
T5. ut 7 vt O uv 6 vu
where  is the precedence relation on T defined by
tu  _v: t+v=u. Axioms T1 and T2 say that D is a
monoid. Axiom T3 states that D is left-cancellative, axiom
T4 that D is anti-symmetric, and axiom T5 that D is locally
linear. It follows from axioms T1T4 that  is a partial
ordering with a unique minimal element 0. Axiom T3 allows
us to define the subtraction operator that is required for the
trajectory axiom: if ut then t&u is defined to be the
unique v with u+v=t. Axiom T5 implies that  is total on
each interval. This last axiom does not occur in [27, 53, 28],
but we fail to have a clear intuition about trajectories
without it. Examples of time domains are the nonnegative
reals, rationals and integers with addition and 0, but also
the sets of finite sequences with concatenation and the
empty sequence.
Theorem A.2. Suppose A is a semi-timed automaton
over a countable time domain. Then A is a timed automaton.
Proof. Suppose that s$ wd A s. We construct a trajectory
w from s$ to s. As required, w(0)=s$ and w(d)=s. Let
t1 , t2 , . . . be some arbitrary enumeration of all the times in
the interval (0, d ). We define w on elements of this sequence,
in order. Let In be the set [0, d, t1 , ..., tn]. We will induc-
tively construct w so that after w has been defined on In , we
will have that w(t$) wwt&t$ w(t) for all t$, t # In , t$<t. This is
enough to show that w is a trajectory from s$ to s.
So suppose that, for some n0, w has been defined on In ,
and that w(t$) wwt&t$ w(t) for all t$, t # In , t$<t. Let u$ be the
largest time in In that is smaller than tn+1 , and let u be the
smallest time in In that is larger than tn+1 . By the hypothesis
22 LYNCH AND VAANDRAGER
File: 643J 254623 . By:CV . Date:19:08:96 . Time:08:11 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 5379 Signs: 3923 . Length: 56 pic 0 pts, 236 mm
about In , we have that w(u$) ww
u$&u w(u). Since u$<tn+1<u,
axiom S2$ implies that there exists a state s such that
w(u$) wwtn+1&u s and s wwwu&tn+1 w(u). Define w(tn+1)=s.
We claim that with this definition of w(tn+1), we have
w(t$) wwt&t$ w(t) for all t$, t # In+1 , t$<t. Since we already
know this for t$, t # In , it is enough to consider the case
where one of t$, t is equal to tn+1. We give the argument for
t=tn+1; the argument for t$=tn+1 is analogous.
So suppose t=tn+1. If t$=u$ then we already have the
needed claim, w(u$) wwwtn+1&u$ w(tn+1). The other possibility
is that t$<u$. But then the claim for In implies that
w(t$) wwu$&t$ w(u$). Since also w(u$) wwwtn+1&u$ w(tn+1), axiom
S1 implies that w(t$) wwwt n+1&t$ w(tn+1), as needed. K
The above proof relies heavily on the assumption that the
time domain is countable: since the interval [t$, t] is
countable we can construct a trajectory from s$ to s in an
inductive fashion, state by state. Such a construction is no
longer possible if the time domain is uncountable, as in the
case of R0.
A.3. A Counterexample
At the time we first defined axiom S2, we constructed
a complex counterexample to show that it was stronger
than S2$. The simpler counterexample described below was
subsequently discovered by Steve Schneider.
Theorem A.3. Let automaton D be defined by
v states(D)=R0_Q0,
v start(D)=[(0, 0)],
v acts(D)=[{] _ R+, and
v steps(D) is specified by (t$, q$) wd D (t, q) 
d # R+ 7 t$+d=t7 q$<q.
Then D is semi-timed, but not timed.
Proof. One can easily check that D is semi-timed.
However, it is not timed: D does not satisfy the trajectory
axiom S2 because that would imply, for instance, that the
interval [0, 1] of reals can be injectively mapped into the
rationals. K
In the context of the present paper, there is no compelling
technical reason why one should use S2 instead of S2$. In
fact, in an earlier version of this paper [42] we have
developed a theory of simulations for semi-timed automata.
However, we find the theory for semi-timed automata less
natural. For instance, the semi-timed automaton D of
Theorem A.3 is a t-forest according to the definitions of
[42], which is strange since an execution that ends in (1, 1)
may pass through state ( 12 ,
1
3) or through state (
1
2 ,
2
3), but not
through both. Also, the appealing local characterization of
t-forests of Lemma 3.4 does not hold for t-forests as defined
in [42]. Trajectories play a vital role in the theory of hybrid
systems [21]. Since we would like to view our timed
automata as an underlying semantic domain for both timed
and hybrid systems, this provides additional motivation for
our choice for the axiom S2.
APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF CONVENTIONS
a Actions
b Backward simulations
c Choice functions
d Positive real numbers
f Forward simulations
g Forwardbackward and backwardforward simulations
h History relations
i Indices
k Symbols
n Natural numbers
p Timed sequence pairs and prophecy relations
r Refinements
s States
t Real numbers plus infinity
u States
w Trajectories
A, B Timed automata
G Digraphs
I Internals (and also invariants)
K Sets of symbols
L Sets of sequences
M, N Types of timed simulation mappings
P, Q Timed trace properties
R Relations
S, U Sets of states
W Timed execution fragments
X, Y, Z Sets
: Execution fragments
; Sequences of external actions (traces)
# Sequences of actions
$ Timed sequence
* The empty sequence
? Projections
_, \ Sequences
{ The internal action
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